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in such cases that the reviewing court have the advantage of all the
expertise and judgment an agency can supply. But the Crowther court
appears to have ignored the basic issue of whether a denial of a motion
to quash a subpoena is even reviewable for alleged agency
arbitrariness. Before remand for a statement of reasons is proper, a
court must find itself permitted to review the action. Agency action on
a motion to quash, because of de novo treatment in the district court,
is exempt from treatment as an adjudication under the APA8' and
thus is not agency action subject to the requirement of a statement of
reasons.8Y The order here in question was not retroactive and had no
binding force in future proceedings; the companies* had no vested
interest in the preservation, of the Mississippi approach without any
deviation whatsoever. Of course the defendant in a Clayton Act action
has a legitimate interest in availing itself of the subpoena powers of
the FTC, and likewise, the subpoenaed companies have an interest in
maintaining their competitive positions. Nevertheless, in the instant
situation more than the conflicting interests of the immediate parties
must be considered. Arguably, the court in Crowther ignored the
public policy consideration militating against delay in the
administrative process. In resolving the conflict between the right of
the public and the parties to know reasons for administrative actions
and the preservation of administrative flexibility in fulfillment of
congressional purposes, courts are repeatedly called upon to balance
interests. An apparently reasonable variation of a formerly approved
ancillary procedure should not be made the cause of unreasonable
delay in effectuating the policies of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Thus, in a subpoena enforcement case, it is arguable that even if
the subpoena order is substantially different from the established
form, once the district court has sustained it, a court of appeals should
affirm in the interest of administrative expediency. A fortiori, in such
a case, a court should not remand for more articulate reasons when
there is not a significant departure from established practice. Both the
court's authority and the wisdom of its decision are questionable.
Agency Decision which Ignores the Examiner's Decision
In Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC89 the Court of
87. APA § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. V, 1970).
88. See FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1959). A statement of reasons is
required by the APA only for agency action which qualifies as an adjudication. See note 63
supra.
89. 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to delimit the
scope of agency discretion to make factual determinations. The
Federal Trade Commission had charged Cinderella with false,
misleading, and deceptive representations to entice prospective
students into its program. After 16 days of hearings, an examiner,

analyzing voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence,
concluded

that

the charges

should

Commissioners, stating their intention

be dismissed.9 0 The

"to examine firsthand and

independently the challenged representations contained in
respondent's advertisements rather than relying on the analysis
thereof contained in the initial decision," 9 1 reversed the hearing
examiner on six of the original charges.12 The court of appeals

reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the grounds that3
the procedure adopted by the Commission denied due process,

holding that the FTC, in reviewing a hearing examiner's initial
decision, may not totally disregard evidence adduced at the hearing
and the examiner's analysis thereof. 4
The Commission's order, viewed as a whole, reveals that the
agency actually considered the hearing examiner's findings and

analysis, merely finding them unpersuasive when juxtaposed with
advertisements which, in the Commissioners' view, were patently

deceptive. 5 Indeed, the Commission's opinion referred at length to the
90. Id. at 584. The hearing was reported in 18,810 pages of transcript. The Commission
called 29 witnesses and introduced 157 exhibits; Cinderalla questioned 23 witnesses and
introduced 90 exhibits. The hearing examiner's initial decision encompassed 93 pages.
18,576, at 20,906
91. School Serv. Inc,, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.

(FTC 1968).
92. Id. at 20,904.
93. 425 F.2d at 585 n.3, 589.
94. Id. at 585. As an alternative ground for its disposition of the case, the court found that
public statements previously made by Chairman Dixon indicated pre-judgment of the case and
that his failure to excuse himself from participation in the review of the initial decision voided
the review proceedings. Id. at 589-92. The court found that Dixon's statements met the test for
disqualification laid down in Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959), that "a disinterested observer may conclude that [the agency] has
in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing
it." The court also noted that Dixon had previously been disqualified for similar conduct,
Texaco Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965), in which the Gilligan standard, supra, had been applied. For
Chairman Dixon's published views on the policy questions involved, see Dixon,
"Disqualification" of Regulatory Agency Members: The New Challenge to the Administrative
Process, 25 FED. B. J.273 (1965). See also Law, Disqualification of SEC Commissioners
Appointed From the Staff.Amos Treat, R.A. Holmon, and the Threat to Expertise, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 257 (1964); Lemov, Administrative Agency News Releases: Public Information
Versus PrivateInjury, 37 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 63 (1968).
95. See, e.g. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,576, at 20,906.
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testimony of numerous witnesses in rejecting the examiner's
evaluation of its significance." Inexplicably, the court later
characterized this testimony as "entirely disregarded" by the
agency. 7 In addition, at two points the agency's report and order
flatly stated that the Commissioners had reviewed the record in
arriving at their ruling.' Thus, although the Commission adopted its
own independent analysis of the advertisements as the basis of its
decision, it clearly did consider the record below in reaching this
decision.
Prior case law vindicates such a practice." The issue was whether
the advertisements had the capacity to deceive, not whether anyone
was in fact deceived. 1 "0It .has been repeatedly held that consumer
testimony does not necessarily control a determination of whether an
advertisement possesses such capacity."'1 In Cinderella the
Commission not only considered the consumer and expert testimony
but gave it weight where pr6bative" 2 and amply catalogued the
respects in which it found the examiner's handling of portions of the
testimony deficient.!! The court's mistaken impression that relevant
evidence had been ignored was undoubtedly pioduced by poor
phrasing in the agency report and order"' but should have been
dispelled by careful consideration of the entire document.
Although the court's analysis of the facts left much to be desired,
its examination of the applicable FTC regulations as they relate to
due process concepts filled a void in existing jurisprudence and
deserves further analysis. Restated, the precise holding was that the
96. Id. at 20,910-13.
97. 425 F.2d at 585.
98. See [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,906, 20,914.
.99. See. e.g.. Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258, 261 n.3 (3d Cir. 1962);
Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961).
100. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,907.
101. See also Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944);
Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising,80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1076 (1967).
102. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 20,913-14.
103. Id. at 20,906, 20,907.
104. In addition to the quotation in the text accompanying note 91 supra. the agency

opinion contained the following two misleading statements:
[I]n view of our decision to independently analyze -

and without assistance from

consumer or other witnesses--the challenged advertisements and their impact... it
becomes unnecessary to review the testimony of these expert and consumer witnesses. Id.
at 20,907. [Flor the reasons stated above the Commission will rely on its own reading and
study of the advertisements to determine whether the questioned representation has the
capacity to deceive. Id. at 20,909-10.
See also 48 TEXAs L. REv. 1385 (1970).
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Federal Trade Commissioners must consider the decision of the
hearing examiner and the evidentiary record upon which it is based
rather than completely ignore them. Unless the Commission has as
full an awareness of all the evidence as the hearing examiner, it may
not reject that officer's initial decision. 0 5 Such a conclusion was
premised on the need for preserving meaningful hearing procedures
which give both the agency and the responding party a fair and equal
opportunity to present exhibits and witnesses in support of their
arguments106 In the court's view, empowering the Commission to
draw independent conclusions while ignoring the record previously
made would render the adversary hearing before the examiner a
ritualistic exercise.107 To buttress this conclusion the court cited
certain of the Commission's own regulations which seemed to require
the Commissioners to consider the entire record. 08 Although these
same regulations stipulated that the Commissioners might exercise
the powers they could have exercised had they made the initial
decision,'" the court found that such a rule did not encompass the
option of completely ignoring the testimony of witnesses and the
findings of the examiner."' Rather, the regulation simply meant that
the reviewing Commissioners had great latitude to disagree with the
examiner. In conclusion, the court noted two practical reasons for its
holding: first, that disregarded testimony might be extremely relevant
since the capacity to mislead the target group-teenage girls-might
be better evaluated by the consumers themselves or experts rather
than the Commissioners;' second, that a reviewing court would
otherwise have difficulty meeting the Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB12 requirement that it consider the entire record in determining
whether the agency's decision was supported by substantial
evidence." 3 If the Commission were allowed to make its
determination without considering all the evidence, courts would be
left with the difficult task of secondhandedly meshing the evidence
adduced at the hearing examination with cryptically enunciated
105. 425 F.2d at 585 n.3.

106. Id. at 587.
107. Id. at 588.
108. Id.;see 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a) & (b) (1970).
109. 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a) (1970).
110. 425 F.2d at 589.
111. Id. at 586. But cf. 80 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 101, at 1076-78.
112. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

113. 425 F.2d at 588.
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Commission conclusions. Such, noted the court, was not the role
envisioned for courts reviewing agency findings merely to determine if
they are supported by substantial evidence. The court's arguments
were based upon sound policy considerations and substantial legal
authority, although little authority was cited."' In addition, other
arguments might have been used by the court to bolster its decision.
Little exception can be taken to the construction of the regulation
in question. The rules of procedure governing FTC adjudications read
in part: "Upon appeal from or review of an initial decision, the
Commission will consider such parts of the record as are cited or as
may be necessary to resolve the issues presented . . . ."I" In the

absence of contrary judicial construction"' it seems appropriate to
give this statement its plain meaning. The straightforward language of
the section is mandatory: the Commission will considerthe record. A

corresponding section of the Administrative Procedure Act on which
this section is undoubtedly patterned imposes the same requirement
on all federal agencies."' The trier of fact cannot arbitrarily reject

items of evidence since such an exclusion obviously violates the very
114. Id. at 588. The court's principal source of authority was the Commission regulation, 16
C.F.R. § 3.54 (1970). For each of the four major propositions on which it based its holding, the
court cited few or no cases although it did dispute the meaning of one substantial body of case
law pressed upon it by the Commission, 425 F.2d at 587 n.5. The Commission cited those cases
for the proposition that "Itihe meaning of advertisements and their tendency or capacity to
deceive are .questions of fact to be determined by the Commission whose determination should
be upheld unless clearly wrong."The court attempted to distinguish such cases on the basis that
the use of the term "Commission" therein referred to the entire commission process, including
review by the Commission of the entire record, not to the Commissioners. Id. at 586, 587. This
rationalization is inadequate. The cases make no formal distinction between the two terms and
are essentially reaffirmations of the traditional principle that purported agency expertise renders
factual determinations of the Commissioner's decision conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. See. e.g., Stauffer Labs. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1965). One case, however, dealt
with a narrower question closely related to problems in Cinderella. In Bakers Franchise Corp. v.
FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962), substantial consumer testimony was marshalled on both sides
.of the question of capacity to deceive. The Commission then asserted its right to find on its own
authority that the advertisements were deceptive and misleading. In the words of the court, "this
method of reaching a conclusion was correct." Id. at 261. In Bakers. however, the fact that the
Commission had given some consideration to the consumer testimony involved was not
controverted. Since it seems that the Cinderella court was wrong in its assertion that the FTC
had not considered consumer testimony, see notes 95-104 and accompanying text, the Bakers
principle should control.
115. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a) (1970).
116. No cases were found construing this particular portion of the Commission's
regulations.
117. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 557 (Supp. V, 1970).
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rudiments of fair play and due process." 8 This is not to say that the
Commission must decide in accordance with any of this evidence or
the conclusions drawn from it by the hearing examiner since the
remaining portion of the relevant Commission regulation reads: "the
Commission . . . in addition, will, to the extent necessary or
desirable, exercise all the power which it could have exercised if it had
made the initial decision." ' This section of the regulation clearly
states that the ultimate product of the decisional process is not
committed to the hearing examiner.120 In the language of one court,
"[t]he examiner's findings are not sacrosanct; there is no mandate
that the Commission accept them."121 But the agency must accord
fair hearing and consideration to all points of view. No specific
quantum of weight is necessarily accorded to any of the evidence
adduced at the hearing.'2 If such were required it would in many
instances "be the examiners and not the agency who make ultimate
policy, and thus the coherence and responsibility of the administrative

scheme would be impaired."

2

These principles come into even sharper focus upon consideration
of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB.' 2l Although that case was primarily concerned with
judicial review of final agency action, its determination involved an
explication of questions also present in Cinderella. The Court stated
that a reviewing court, when determining whether an agency's
decision was supported by substantial evidence, should consider the
initial findings of the hearing examiner as part of the record'? and
afford them such credence as they "intrinsically command," no more
and no less. 126 The clear warning to the agencies was that they must
consider and attribute some significance to the examiner's findings to
assure likely affirmance on judicial review.'2 Subsequent cases have
118. Cf. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 (1924) ("The provision for a
hearing implies both the privilege of introducing evidence and the duty of deciding in accordance
with it."); accord, Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941).
119. 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a) (1970).
120. Warehousemen & Mail Order Employees, Local No. 743 v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 865, 869
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
121. United States Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 1962).
122. Cf 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.04 at 18 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS]; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 611 (1965).
123. L. JAFFE, supra note 122, at 613.
124. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
125. Id. at 493.
126. Id. at495.
127. See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 122, at 610-13.
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continued to apply this requirement." 2

Policy reasons for the court's requirement in Cinderella readily
suggest themselves. The proposition is well settled that the'
appropriate role for a court in reviewing agency action does not

include either the renewed taking of evidence'

or the copious

reevaluation of evidence previously presented to the agency. 30 Indeed,

these are two of the functions which in large part justify the existence
of the agency in the first instance. The failure of the reviewing agency
to consider all available data initially unduly complicates the task of
the reviewing court under the substantial evidence rule. Requiring the
court to engage in a minute search of the hearing record to determine

if it squares with ambiguous Commission conclusions is at the very
least extraordinarily wasteful of precious judicial time even if not

"impossible"

or "inappropriate"' 3'

and may in certain

circumstances violate the Constitution. 3 2 Additionally, the framers of
the APA intended that the requirement of review by the judiciary

upon the whole record should mean that "courts may not look only to
the case presented by one party, since other evidence may weaken or

even indisputably destroy that case."'3

Though there are many

128. See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
129. See NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1952).
[In reviewing a judge's findings] we are given power to review the facts, whereas, in
[reviewing administrative findings], our power is limited to setting aside the findings of
the agency if not supported by substantial evidence ..... If Congress had intended to
give a power of review similar to that on appeals in equity, it knew perfectly well how to
'do so, as shown by the provision for review of tax court decisions. . . .The proposition
was fully considered and was rejected because the effect of its adoption would have been
to destroy the unified administration attained by the creation of a single agency and to
make of the eleven courts of appeal eleven super agencies. Id. at 246.
Accord, Rosedale Coal Co. v. Director of United States Bureau of Mines, 247 F.2d 299, 305-06
(4th Cir. 1957).
130. See 4 DAVIS § 29.01: "the main inquiry is whether on the record the agency could
reasonably make the finding."
131. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
132. A constitutional court "cannot participate in the exercise of functions that are
essentially legislative or administrative." See Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric
Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930). "If a federal court is requied to do all over again what the agency has
done, the system of review violates Article III of the Constitution." Id. at 469. See also 4 DAVIs
§ 29.10. "The reason for the holdings that nonjudicial functions may not be reviewed de novo is
not that a court is lacking in qualification to make findings of fact from conflicting evidence but
that a court may be lacking in qualification to take over the discretionarypower."
133. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1946). The Supreme Court made clear in
Universal Camerathat it literally interprets both the words of the statute and the words of the
Committee Reports. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also 4
DAVIS § 29.03 (1965).
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respects in which the roles of reviewing court and reviewing agency are
35
dissimilar, 1 this requirement should also be applied to the agency.
Otherwise, as the Cinderella court pointed out, a party may be
deprived of its only opportunity to make a presentation of those
elements it considers most favorable to its case.
Lack of consideration of initial decisions also detracts from the
importance and prestige of the hearing examiner. Great effort has
been expended to foster independence and competence in these
officials 37 who have broad powers somewhat comparable to judges to
issue subpoenas, order depositions, rule on offers of evidence, and
take additional steps as authorized by law to conduct a proper
hearing. 3 8 In the FTC, as in many other agencies, the examiner is
authorized to make the initial decision which will become the decision
13 9
of the agency unless appealed and reversed or stayed by the agency.
The examiner is thought particularly qualified to decide questions of
relevance, credibility, and weight to be given conflicting testimony'
and therefore the FTC and other agencies have been justifiably
reluctant to reverse examiner decisions.' Allowing agencies to
disregard completely the findings of these officers may severely
hamper their effectiveness.
Agency review practices envisioned by the Cinderellacourt call to
mind Chief Justice Hughes' pithy admonition that "an unscrupulous
administrator might be tempted to say, let me find the facts for the
people of my country and I care little who lays down the general
134. For example, the particularity with which the findings of the tribunal below are
examined. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
135. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 51 (1941): "In general the relationship upon appeal between the hearing
commissioner and the agency ought to a considerable extent to be that of trial court to appellate
court. Conclusions, interpretations, law and policy should, of course, be open to full review."
See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,492-97 (1950).
136. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
137. See generally Macy, The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable
PoliticalSociety, 27 FED. B.J. 351 (1967). The APA made the examiners independent of the
agencies in tenure and compensation. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7521, 5335(a)(B) (Supp. V, 1970). Although
the agencies may select their own examiners, their selections are limited to a list of rigorously
qualified applicants maintained by the Civil Service Commission. See also Note, The Status of
the Trial Examiner in AdministrativeAgencies, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1953).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (Supp. V, 1970).
139. Id. § 557; 16 C.F.R. § 3.5 1(a) (1970), as amended, 35 Fed. Reg. 10656 (1970).
140. See 80 HARV. L. REV., supranote 101, at 1075.
141. See Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: InternationalOrganization and
Procedure,48 MINN. L. REv.383, 467-68 (1964); Millstein, The FederalTrade Commission and
FalseAdvertising, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 439 (1964).
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principles."' 4 2 Obviously, the finding of facts is a crucial step in

achieving substantial justice for parties in administrative proceedings.
*The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Cinderella recognized
the necessity for steering a course between according the findings of

the hearing examiner a significance which might impair the policymaking function of the agency involved and completely ignoring those

findings, thereby prejudicing the legitimate claims of parties and
degrading the. important function of the hearing examiner in the

administrative process. What is required of the agency is a delicate
exercise of restraint and a fine sensitivity not only to its own role in the
application of administrative law but also to those of the trial
examiner and the reviewing court. Cinderella's restatement of the
* applicable legal principles should clarify the problems involved and
serve as protection for rights affected by the very significant power of

an agency to find the facts.
VIII.

JUDICIAL REVIEW-RIGHT OF REVIEW

Standing to Seek JudicialReview

Prior to 1970, two primary methods for obtaining standing to
appeal a decision of a federal administrative agency existed.'

Appellants could allege an invasion of an interest protected by the
3
common law 2 or assert statutory authorization for judicial review.
Allegations of both were labeled "legal rights," a term defined by the
Supreme Court in Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA 4 as rights of property,
142. Address by Charles Evans Hughes before the Federal Bar Association, quoted In
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

135, 136 (1938).

I. Note, Standing to Challenge FederalAdministrative Actions in the Wake ofAssociation
of Data ProcessingService Orgainzations, Inc. v. Camp, I LOYOLA U. (CHI.) L.J. 285, 289
(1970). The question should be distinguished from the ability of persons to intervene in
administrative proceedings. Intervention is controlled by agency regulations; hence, permission
to intervene is not necessarily recognition that a petitioner is a sufficiently aggrieved party for
standing purposes. FPC Order Issuing Preliminary Permit and Granting Petition to Intervene,
Project No. 2702 (Nov. 18, 1970). See ANCILLARY MATrERS section of the Project supra.
2. Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939).
3. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964)
("any person who will be adversely affected by such an order may obtain judicial review");
Federal Power Commission Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964) ("any party. . . aggrieved by an
order. . . may obtain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals"). But see
Sugar Act of 1947, 7 U.S.C. § 1136 (1964), for an example of statutory preclusion of judicial
review.
4. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).

